Introduction
Advanced economies with well-developed financial markets, credible monetary policies, and a broad nexus of commercial partners generally allowed market forces to determine their exchange rates.
1 Flexible exchange rates provide these economies with a higher degree of monetary-policy independence and with greater protection from idiosyncratic economic shocks than any system of fixed parities possibly could. The
Bretton Woods system collapsed, after all, because of Europe's displeasure with a high, U.S.-determined inflation rate and because of the uneven impact of oil price shocks.
These same governments, however, have often refused markets free reign in determining the exchange value of their currencies. Although professing confidence in the overall competitive efficiency of foreign exchange markets, policy makers believe that information imperfections sometime make these markets excessively volatile or drive exchange rates away from values consistent with their underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. While similar information imperfections may affect other financial markets, government interventionists contend that the macroeconomic implications of even temporary exchange-market failures are great enough to warrant corrective actions.
With fiscal policy too unresponsive and capital or trade controls too disruptive, such corrective actions naturally fall to monetary authorities.
Adding orderly exchange-market conditions to the list of central bank responsibilities, presents policy makers with the classic problem of more targets than independent instruments. When a central bank pursues an exchange-rate objective, it can sometimes lose control of its inflation target. The outcome depends on the nature of the underlying exchange-market disturbance. To be sure some trade-off is feasible, but in general, a central bank that pursues two objectives with a single instrument can lose credibility with respect to both goals. How much inflation will a central bank tolerate to avoid a further appreciation of the exchange rate? How big an appreciation will it endure to avoid inflation?
This basic targets-versus-instruments problem underlies the controversy about foreign-exchange market intervention. The central question that both the theoretical and empirical investigations address is: Does intervention afford monetary authorities a means of influencing exchange rates independent of their domestic monetary policy objectives?
Overall, the existing research has failed to find reliable connections between official transactions and fundamental determinants of exchange rates that would allow monetary authorities to determine exchange rates independent of monetary policy.
Instead, studies suggest the intervention can sometimes affect exchange rates in a manner that depends on such market conditions as the firmness and consistency of agents'
expectations. Analysts increasing view intervention from an information perspective and ask: What operational conditions (e.g., transaction size; frequency, etc.) increase the chances that an intervention will have the desired effect on exchange rates? How long might the effect last? In what sense might intervention determine exchange rates?
These are not merely academic questions. Intervention remains an active policy tool. Although the frequency of intervention may have tapered off, notably in the United
States and Europe, the size of an average transaction appears to have grown (Chiu 2003 . Neely 2001 , Lecourt and Raymond, 2003 . The Japanese Ministry of Finance has recently come under sharp criticism, primarily from U.S. manufacturers, for frequent and heavy interventions designed to stem a yen appreciation. Consequently, intervention remains a fruitful area for an active research agenda.
This article attempts to provide a fairly comprehensive introduction to the economics of foreign exchange intervention. 2 In section two, I define terms and draw an important distinction between official transactions that affect bank reserves and those that do not. Only the later type of transaction provides monetary policy makers with an independent mechanism for influencing exchange rates. In section three, I discuss possible theoretical channels through with intervention might alter exchange rates, focusing on the important role of expectations. Section four is a summary of the empirical evidence on the relationship between intervention and exchange rates. I do not provide a "he said -she said" type of review. Instead, I group previous studies according to the various topics mentioned in empirical section in the reference pages at the end of this paper. In section five, I discuss the connection between intervention and technical trading rule profits. Section six concludes with a short statement on the state of the art.
Intervention as Distinct from Monetary Policy
Intervention refers to official purchases or sales of foreign exchange undertaken to influence exchange rates. This definition describes intervention in terms of (1) a type of transaction and (2) a motive guiding such transactions.
The distinction among various types of transactions is important because countries have many policy levers through which to affect the exchange values of their (2003) , Chiu (2003 Other policy options similarly do not constitute intervention under my definition.
Tobin (1980) suggested a tax on foreign-exchange transactions as a means of reducing exchange-rate volatility, and countries with pegged exchange rates often have resorted to various types of capital restraints in defense of their parities. In addition, some countries routinely try to jawbone exchange rates in one direction or another. These do not constitute intervention because they are not amenable to day-to-day exchange-rate management. I am concerned with the high-frequency foreign-exchange activities that do not alter a country's monetary base.
An understanding of the motive for buying or selling foreign exchange is also a necessary component of the definition of intervention because governments often transact in foreign exchange for purposes other than altering their exchange rates. Central banks sometimes buy or sell foreign exchange to manage the currency composition of their 2 Previous surveys include: Edison (1993) , Almekinders (1995 ), Bailey, et al. (2000 , and Sarno and Taylor (2001) . 3 On monetary policy, exchange rates, and economic shocks, see Turnovsky (1999) and Bordo and Schwartz (1989 Craig and Humpage, 2003 and Bordo and Schwartz, 1989) .
Sterilization is also important in countries whose central banks are independent, but whose fiscal authorities maintain primary responsibility for intervention, because in the absence of sterilization, the fiscal authorities would maintain some direct control over monetary policy. In the Japan, for example, the Ministry of Finance maintains authority for foreign exchange intervention, and the, otherwise independent, Bank of Japan acts as 
Theoretical Underpinnings

Exchange Rate Model
The asset market approach to exchange-rate determination provides a useful framework for conceptualizing the channels through which sterilized intervention might influence exchange rates. The asset market approach describes the exchange rate at time t (S t ) in terms of current fundamentals (Z t ) and a proportion (λ) of the expect future change in the exchange rate:
where λ ∈ (0,1]; E t is the expectations operator and Ω t is the information set. Z includes variables common to the asset market approach. Solving equation (1) forward yields
, which emphasizes that current exchange rates depend on current fundamentals, and the expected future path of fundamentals. In addition to a fundamental solution, this equation also can have multiple, so-called, bubble solutions (see Aguilar and Nydahl, 2000) . 5 The model suggests that sterilized intervention might affect the spot exchange rate either via some current fundamental (other than money), through expectations about future fundamentals, or expectations not based on fundamentals. These channels have starkly different policy implications.
Portfolio-Balance Channel
The process of sterilizing a foreign-exchange intervention through typical openmarket operations will alter the currency composition of publicly held government securities, which the asset-market-approach to exchange rate determination views as an important fundamental. If risk-averse asset holders view these securities as imperfect substitutes, they will hold them in their portfolio only if their expected rates of return compensate them for the perceived relative risk. Although economists lack a widely accepted theoretical model of the foreign exchange risk premium, most express itamong other things-as a positive function of relative assets supplies. The portfoliobalance mechanism directly links intervention and spot exchange rates through Z t in equations 1 and 2, thereby providing monetary authorities an independent channel through which to influence exchange-rate movements. A sterilized purchase of foreign exchange, for example, increases the amount of publicly held domestic bonds relative to foreign bonds, inducing a depreciation of the domestic currency.
Unfortunately, with an unanimity rare in economics, most empirical studies find the relationship to be either statistically insignificant or quantitatively negligible. The reason offered for the lack of a portfolio effect is that the typical intervention transaction is miniscule relative to the stock of outstanding assets. is a notable, often cited, exception to the standard conclusion. In addition, a number of papers find some connection between intervention and uncovered interest parity, but the relationship is not very robust and, therefore, seems more consistent with an expectations effect. Galati, Melick, and Micu (forthcoming) suggest that a portfolio channel might still be relevant for emerging markets, if these countries have large reserve portfolios relative to the turnover in their local foreign exchange markets. 
Signaling or Expectations Channel
In a market characterized by information asymmetries, a monetary authority that had an information advantage with respect to current and prospective market fundaments could influence exchange rates if that authority conveyed private information to the market through its intervention. Most monetary authorities and many economists believe that intervention works through such a signaling or expectations channel. Intervention, of course, may offer a passive signal of future monetary policy; that is, purchases and sales of foreign exchange may simple be correlated with a future easing or tightening in monetary policy. In this case, one might find episodic evidence of signaling. Specifically, when the original shock to the exchange market results from an excessive easing or tightening in monetary policy, intervention might predict future policy corrections. One would then only find a consistent correlation between intervention and future changes in monetary policy if the underlying shock to the exchange rate was persistently monetary in nature. When the underlying shock to the exchange market is not of that type, one might not find evidence of signaling.
As one might expect, if signaling depended on the nature of the causal shock, the empirical evidence for or against signaling should be mixed, and indeed it is, with no clear consensus emerging from this literature. Kaminsky and Lewis (1996) , which is often cited as evidence for signaling, also finds that when intervention is supported by consistent movements in monetary policy, exchange rates tend to respond in the expected direction, but when intervention is followed by inconsistent monetary policy, exchange rates tend to move in the opposite direction. (2001) argue, then their interventions should accurately predict future exchange-rate movements;
that is, researchers should be able to uncover a statistically valid relationship between the two.
Empirical Evidence on Intervention
In recent years, as more and more central banks have released data on their official foreign exchange market operations, empirical research on the effectiveness of intervention has sharply grown. The results of this work have begun to converge towards consensus understanding on a number of important issues.
A Consensus View
Even though most empirical studies do not provide a fully articulated theoretical model of intervention, economists typically interpret their results as evidence of a broad signaling channel. These results clearly demonstrate a high-frequency-daily or intradaily-connection between foreign exchange market intervention and exchange rates.
The results, however, are not always robust across currencies, time periods and empirical techniques. Recent studies using intra-daily data suggest that exchange rates respond to intervention within minutes or hours, and some even suggest that exchange rates react in anticipation of an intervention or before the intervention is widely known in the market.
Unfortunately we do not know much about the duration of these effects. Given the near martingale nature of exchange-rate changes, however, it seems reasonable to interpret them as highly persistent, if not permanent. By affecting expectations, intervention sets the exchange rate off on an alternative random-walk path, but one that is consistent with the pre-existing, unaltered market fundamentals. Some intra-day studies suggest short-term persistence, but beyond one day, we really have little to say.
Many researchers also consider the second-moment of the exchange-rate process, finding that intervention typically increases exchange-rate volatility. They often interpret this finding has evidence of a perverse or destabilizing effect, but in a market 
Methodological Problems and the Evidence on Intervention
The myriad studies on foreign-exchange intervention are almost all empirical.
They incorporate a broad range of experimental strategies and techniques. The various methodologies present researchers with different types of problems, about which anyone assessing their results needs to be mindful.
The overarching problem that confronts all empirical research on intervention is the simultaneous determination of official intervention and exchange-rate changes.
Because researchers lack a sufficient amount of high frequency data, they generally have not applied standard statistical techniques to this problem. Instead, those using timeseries analysis or regression-based event studies, typically manage the timing of their data so that intervention occurs before the exchange rate. Sometimes choosing an end-ofday exchange rate is sufficient to accomplish this; other times, lagging the intervention term one period is necessary. In this latter case, the higher the data frequently, the better.
Given that intervention often appears to affect exchange rate within minutes, estimating and interpreting a lag on an intervention term of even one day may be problematic.
Studies that do not solve the timing issue tell us nothing about the efficacy of intervention.
Modeling the decision to intervene can provide a step toward addressing the simultaneity problem. Typical specifications of intervention reaction functions include An alternative strategy for minimizing simultaneity problems is to define various success criteria for intervention and then to evaluate the frequency of success over a specific period against a null hypothesis embodying randomness. This technique requires careful consideration of the appropriate probability distribution for the success counts.
Individual successes need not be independent events and researchers often have little basis for exogenously assigning a probability to an individual success. Morevoer, determining whether a success count is random or not also requires that interventions be sterilized, much like the statistical analysis of coin flips assumes a fair coin. Specifying individual success criteria also permits researchers to estimate the probability of success conditional on various aspects of the intervention process-such as its size or whether it was coordinated-in a probit or logit model.
Defining success criteria is very much in the spirit of an event study. Some researchers are applying more traditional event study techniques to data at frequencies higher that a single day. These studies investigate the relationship between exchange-rate changes and various leads and lags on the intervention term, using regression techniques.
Given the overarching simultaneity problem, interpreting causality as running strictly from intervention to exchange rates on the contemporaneous coefficient and on coefficients where intervention "leads" the exchange rate remains tricky, even when the signs on the appropriate terms have a reasonable interpretation. Some event studies
widen the event window beyond a single day. As the event window opens, the chances grow that factors besides intervention (e.g., interest-rate changes) will confound any correlation between intervention and exchange rates.
Monetary authorities intervene out concern for both the level and the volatility of their exchange rates. GARCH models are particularly well suited to the study of intervention because they allow researchers to simultaneously estimate a conditionalmean equation and a conditional variance equation, with each containing intervention terms. One can interpret the appropriate coefficients in the conditional-mean equation and in the conditional-variance equation as, respectively, depicting the effects of intervention on the trend and on the volatility of the exchange-rate process. Although GARCH techniques seem to offer a better strategy for modeling exchange-rate processes than many other times-series methods, they do not avoid any of the statistical problems discussed above.
An alternative approach for investigating the effects on intervention on the second moment of the exchange-rate process measures the volatility of expected exchange-rate changes as implied by prices of options on exchange-rate futures. Extracting exchangerate volatility from option prices on futures contracts, instead calculating a variance term from actual exchange rates, lets researchers directly consider the impact on intervention on expectations. Consequently, this approach seems more compatible with the view that intervention operates through a broad signaling channel. The methodology still confronts many of the previously mentioned econometric problems, and results may be sensitive to the type of underlying option and to assumptions about risk neutrality.
A couple of recent studies have extended the use of option prices to study the impact of intervention on the entire expected distribution of future exchange ratesmean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis. Each of the higher moments potentially offers a specific insight about the nature of expectations. Holding the first two moments constant, skewness suggests that the market attaches greater probability to a specific direction of change, and kurtosis suggests that the market attaches a great deal of probability to very large changes.
Similarly, only a couple of papers have considered the effect of official intervention on the behavior of bid-ask spreads for foreign exchange. This seems a particularly fruitful area of investigation because one interpretation (adverse selection costs) views bid-ask spread as, in part, providing protection to market makers against transactions with better informed traders. The latter might include central banks.
Central Bank Profits and Technical Trading Rules
Monetary authorities that intervene usually acquire and hold portfolios of very liquid, interest earning, foreign-currency-denominated assets. Generally, these positions are uncovered-exposed to valuation gains and losses. 
The State of the Art
Sterilized intervention affords monetary policy makers a means of occasionally pushing an exchange rate in a desired direction. The alternative level then serves as a new starting point for a random walk process compatible with existing fundamentals.
The empirical support for this conclusions seems consistent with the idea that monetary authorities periodically possess better information than other market participants and, in these instances, can sometimes can affect market expectations through intervention. This description does not preclude intervention as a signal of future monetary policy, but interpreting intervention as solely or even primarily such a signal is probably wrong. The likelihood that a given intervention will have the desired effect increases if the transaction is large and coordinated with the foreign monetary authority whose currency is involved.
Nevertheless, because sterilized intervention does not affect market fundaments, it does not afford monetary authorities a means of routinely guiding their exchange rates along a path that they determine independent of their monetary policies. While monetary authorities in large developed countries certainly can affect nominal exchange rates through non-sterilized foreign exchange intervention, doing so either will conflict with their domestic policy objectives or it will be entirely redundant to open market operation in domestic securities. The outcome depends on the nature of the underlying economic shock to their exchange market. 
